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The Trickyffrickster Role of the
Anthropologist: Ethical Dilemmas of
the Consultant Anthropologist in
Papua New Guinea
It is for each individual to work out for
themselves their own moral boundmies, to
understand and delimit that with which she or
he would or would not be involved. For
anthropologists, members of a discipline that
has for decades been the scapegoat of the social
sciences as the hand-maidens of colonial
oppressors, these limits need to be more
explicit, more fully internalized and reckoned
with. Globalization, as a process, is not new.
nor are its effects fully determinable prior to
anyone action. In recent years, as global
capital and technology move with greater
rapidity towards what were once seemingly
unreachable corners of the eal1h.
anthropologists, generally Westerners who have
studied these seemingly exotic corners. are
being hired to come along for the lide in a new
non-academic form. The vogue of development
and its popular conception as having a
synonymy with progress and globalization an:
issues which must be addressed.
As a student at the beginning of my
academic career, I feel I can address the
questions and concerns about the ethical
responsibilities of the consultant anthropologist
with the reference and reverence due to those
who have negotiated these uicky situations
before me. I am faced with many disconcerting
questions: I want to know about the role of the
anthropologist who works outside of an
academic system, who lends their skills and
knowledge gained by virtue of their research
and training to systems and processes that ha\'e
reasons for entering these 'exotic' far reaches of
the earth very different than those of the pursuit
of ethnographic inquiry. Rooted in these
concerns are issues of responsibility, obligation,
confidentiality, ownership and the inherent value
of academia.
As a 'fledgling anthropologist", many of
my peers will either eschew the life of academia
for work in consultancy and development
situations or attempt to maintain the difficult and
delicate balance between academia and what we
glibly term 'the real world', Before I or any
anthropologist does this, we need to puzzle these
questions out for ourselves.
It is my feeling that the work of
anthropology stm1s with an enormous gift-that
of being allowed to immerse, as much as an
outsider can, into another population' s culture and
lives. I wonder however, if this gift does not also
incur an enormous debt. If such a debt (one more
figurative than literal) is accrued, how is it one
retains their position and their positionality while
fulfilling these obligations. I need, we need, each
of us, to decide what we mean when we tell
others that we hope to become an anthropologist
of worth.
That being said, and with these lovely,
lofty aspirations in mind, I will attempt to puzzle
through a number of questions that seem to me to
be ethical dilemmas. Exactly what are the ethical
impasses that arise if an anthropologist works in
an applied or consultancy situation for a capitalist
enterprise? I will be focusing on a pm1icular kind
of consultancy with reference to Papua New
Guinea and mining to ground my questions. Is
there difference between working for a company
and working for a local population as an
anthropologist for hire? What about working for
the state, or an NGO? Are the ground rules
different in this case? Where can an
anthropologist draw the line between fulfilling a
debt and being complicit in destruction-though
with the best of intentions? These questions are
not entirely all personal or related to the
anthropologist as an individuaL questions
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surrounding academic freedom, co-optation and
ownership of research impact the discipline as a
whole and therefore must also be examined.
I find myself incredibly uncomfortable,
both personally, and in reference to the
discipline under which I hope to serve (and
serve is a word I choose quite deliberately).
when issues of research for money outside the
scope of academia are brought to the fore.
There is some very questionable ground that an
anthropologist walks on in terms of her or his
own legitimacy when she or he enters into a
consultancy situation wherein they recognizing
that she or he is being paid by a group (in the
case of this piece, a mining company) that does
not have the noblest of intentions, regardless of
their purported or real purity of intent. Yet for
most anthropologists, the argument most often
made for involvement as a consultant is one
based on emotion. and with the noblest of
intentions in mind. Escobar (1991) writes that
the most common reason for involvement in the
development process is that non-involvement
would be more detlimental to people in
positions of poverty because without the
intervention of the anthropologist (or social
scientist) one is assured of failure. In other
words, we know as anthropologists that a
development project will fail regardless, but
hope that if we accept a consultancy position we
may lessen the burden on the local who will be
affected. I would argue that until the
development process uses methods and
indicators of success that would make
anthropological intervention fruitful. one is
simply being paid to be complicit in the system:
as a result, one's position as an academic to
cliticize these wrong-doings is compromised.
These statements may seem Draconian. but the
discipline's history bears the scars of these
misjudgments.
In 1972, Jasper Ingersoll wrote about
the situation of anthropologists in de\'c1opmel1l
as having "an old hate relationship and a new
love affair". He argue that anthropologists.
while often involved in developmcnt projects as
consultants, have little effect on the design and
implementation of projects bccausc thosc
projects are conceived through the lens of
economic growth and use measurcs such as
GNP for evidence of success. Somc would
argue that little has changed sincc 1972. But
the question that Ingersoll's work spawns is onc
that I will return to later. Does thc fact that an
anthropologist's work will be negatcd by \inuc
of the design and implicit goals of a projcct
mean that she or he should disavow themselves of
the process entirely, and thus ensure that there
will be no pertinent analysis?
As a discipline, anthropology began with
highly applied goals. Colonial and post colonial
attempts to define the exotic 'other' for
administrative and colonial use by way of funding
anthropologists for their research has left a mar on
the discipline. (Wilkins 1982: 112). In the
1950s, coincident with the spread of anthropology
departments at many universities. a shift away
from this policy Oliented fieldwork began.
Wilkins argues: "a professional social
anthropology, created a body of published work
which might be used for policy applications, but
which was not, as a rule, generated by policy
questions" was created (ibid.:114). Recently
however, the rise of multinational corporations
and increased and faster links between countries
and peoples in a time when many countries are
enteling their post-colonial stage, has led to the
call for anthropologists to return to working with
an eye towards policy. business agreements.
expert testimony. etc.
I have chosen as ethnographic grounds
to explore my dilemmas the country of Papua
New Guinea. This country has been an arena of
vast anthropological research for many decades.
Since independence in 1975, there have been
several enormous mining projects working in the
country. Mostly in isolated areas. these projects
characteristically involve complicated
negotiations with disenfranchised and relatively
remote groups of people over compensation, land
ownership, employment and environmental
degradation. Because of the capital intensive
nature of these projects. they are run almost
exclusively by large multinational corporations
from South East Asia and beyond. These
transnational corporations are, however,
welcomed by government and citizens because
the projects are equated with economic and often
cultural development. not to mention access to
goods and services not easily provided by the
state alone. Thus in Papua New Guinea
development is equatcd with investment as well
as major resource extraction.
What makcs this situation especially
pertinent for the purposes of this study is that
Papua New Guinea law requires that mining and
other companies commission social impact
studies in order that potential social and economic
problems might be idcntified. Anthropologists
who have long worked in these proposed mining
areas are often hired to write these studies and
deal with other problems that involve 'traditional
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communities' of Papua New Guinea. These
projects are notOliously ill-fated, the scale of
social disruption and environmental catastrophe
is similar in many ways to the problems
experienced by other massive development
projects. Strathell1 and Stewart argue, even for
those not working as consultants "the arena of
research in general, especially in places affected
by large scale development projects, is rather
like a minefield through which researchers must
pick their way" (200 I: 5). I will return to his
question of the anthropologist working within a
situation that he or she knows will be disruptive
a little later. It is a question more contingent on
factors personal to the anthropologist, although,
the following will show, that it is difficult to
separate the personal from the professional in a
situation such as this. It is prudent to first
outline the ways in which I believe the applied
anthropologist who works for groups other than
their own group of study is compromised.
The analogy of a minefield is
extremely useful for the purposes of this
discussion. Using a series of papers written by
various anthropologists who have worked in
various applied and academic positions in
Papua New Guinea for development and other
purposes as a base from which to construct my
argument. I am forced to ask questions that
relate to the people under study, the legitimacy
of the discipline, and the personal integrity of
consultant anthropologists. Previously, my
primary concern had been to separate all of my
questions into neat categories, to see which
issue would affect which of the three above
categories, but as Strathern and Stewart argue:
There is a sense that
consultancy work is unusual
and is enclaved away from the
supposed mainstream array of
topics. We maintain that a
rigid compartmentalization of
the work of anthropological
consultancy within the
discipline as a whole is
unrealistic. Theory, analysis,
description and practice need
to be related to one another,
and the pragmatic problems
the ethical questions, and the
imponderabilities of making
appropriate theoretical
analyses which face the
anthropologist as general
ethnographer. The question
of analysis of material in
relation to policy aims is
particularly and obviously
crucial (2001: 8).
One of the issues that we have to consider is the
actual work that is produced by the consultant
anthropologist. Unlike academic resear'ch, where
anthropologists have a general idea of what they
would like to study but let the course of
fieldwork ultimately determine what is most
cogent to write about, consultants working in and
around development projects are much more
constrained. Rohatynskyj did her work in Papua
New Guinea as a consultant hired by the Tolai to
survey the ethic groups surrounding themselves.
This in itself is a strange position to be in-one
which does not necessarily fit into the scope of
this work .. Important, however, is Rohatynskyj's
discussion of the consultant's report.
The parameter's of the
consultant's report are set by
the terms of reference of the
research agreed to by the
contractor and the researcher as
well as the author's
appreciation of the terms in
which results will most readily
be accepted ... The relationship
between the audience and the
researcher becomes more
emphasized than the one
between the researcher and the
community of study in the
formulation of the text of the
report (2001: 24 emphasis
added).
Compromise it seems is inherent in the
formulation of a consultant's report. My problem
here is not so much the fact that consultants are
not able to produce academic writing, rather that
those who are producing these consultant's
repOlts are academics. As academics, all we
have is our name, and the backing of an
institution from which comes our academic
freedom. To work as a consultant is to co-opt the
legitimacy that comes with the title of
anthropologist and use it to produce work that is
subject to a vastly different set of restraints.
Rohatynskyj would disagree with me here. She
argues:
The ethics of academic research
are not so clearly
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distinguishable from those of
contracted research,
especially as we have come to
appreciate the long and shOlt
term impact of our
ethnographic wliting on the
identity construction of
groups within regional and
global systems (2001: 37).
I find this questionable. The issue of shOlt term
versus long-term impact has clearly
distinguishable charactelistics for the academic
versus consultant researcher. In theory, the
academic researcher, if cognizant of
detrimental effects that could come about as a
result of her or his work, has the benefit of
pseudonyms to protect those about whom they
she or he is writing. Moreover, the academic
writes within a system of constant peer
criticism and rebuttal. One only had to think of
the decades long feud between E. R. Leach and
Claude Levi-Strauss to see the way in which
academic debate over one another's ideas and
postulations can change the shape of the
discipline (Tambiah: 2002). The contracted
researcher does not have this benefit or
obligation to make her or his work stand up to
cliticism. It is wlitten by academics with
claims to authority and legitimacy but does not
stand for criticism by peers. It is my belief that
the strongest criticism-the most cogent way to
fulfill one's moral bounds cannot and does not
come from a consultant position wherein the
contracting company makes claims of
objectivity, authority and legitimacy by virtue
of their purchase of the work of the
anthropologist. Further, the areas of interest
that are set out before fieldwork begins, as
mentioned, bind the contracted researcher.
The academic anthropologist always
has the option of choosing not to speak of a
particular area of concern. Lorenzo Brutti
(2001: 94) says that consultancy is a "take it or
leave it situation". The length of contract is
generally very binding. If one needs more time,
or the topic does not fit nicely within the
researcher's interests or comfort level, too
bad ... she or he has already been paid. This
does not work nicely with the rigors and even
constraints of academic research, where grants
for funding are based on time and topics well,
but are generally not revoked if the researcher
strays from the initial topic or finds results not
expected. In shOlt, the problem here is that the
contractor has a stake in the content of the
applied researcher's work, whereas the academic
funding institution or group has a stake only in
the quality.
Time constraints are one of the more
important ways in which anthropologists are
compromised in consultancy positions. More
important than the tinling of the contract. is the
length of time in the field. Rohatynskyj writes
that she wanted to spend at least one month in
each of twelve different sites to prepare her
report, but in fact "This proved unrealistic
because of expense, needs to conform to other 's
transportation schedules .. .In effect, I was doing
cultural survey work and had to adjust my
methodology" (200 I: 30). The problem mises
when Rohatynskyj is commissioned as an
anthropologist, and then uses methods which are
not conducive to anthropological study. Her
results, which she admits suffer because of that
compromise, are still viewed by wider audiences
as the work of an anthropologist and given the
credit and authOlity due work of that caliber.
Anthropology is unique among the social sciences
for its insistence on long periods of fieldwork. As
a consultant who is accredited to be an
anthropologist who does not follow the basic
strictures of the discipline, does Rohatynskyj not
do a discredit both to the discipline and to her
own credibility? The immediate response to this
line of inquiry would be to say that Rohatynskyj
was not commissioned to write an academic piece
and therefore is not to be held up to those
standards. The reports that are produced by
consultants for the state, a corporation or an NGO
fall into the realm of grey literature (Bryant and
Bailey: 1997). That is, literature that is more
accessible to public consumption. It is not
however, acadenlic discourse, though it may be
perceived as such and given the stead due
academic discourse because of the
anthropological credentials of the author.
Rohatynskyj says that there are ways in which
one can frame their work and still implicate their
contractor in a manner that would allow her to
remain, to herself at least, ethically viable. But I
find this a little hard to take. It seems that once
an anthropologist accepts money for fees outside
of the realm of acadenlia, there is some form of
identity shift. even if only in terms of others
perceptions that is not easily negotiated.
In addition to the time and scope of
contracts and repOlts, the applied or consultant
researcher does not own the work produced, a
factor which to me may be the single most
important reason for my discOmfOlt. Academics
are able to work within a system of academic
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freedom. They are free to wlite whatever they
desire with relative protection by virtue of their
association with academia. This means that
even great criticism can be made without fear of
violating a contractual agreement. The
academic who begins her or his career can
extrapolate from her or his research to grander
theory and more wide ranging ideas which, in
turn, may be applied to other situations.
Consultants are most often bounds by non-
disclosure agreements. This means that the
work that they produce is not owned by
themselves to do with what they wish, but is the
property of the contractor. In the case of Papua
New Guinea, consultant anthropologists
generally come into the contract position having
done some fieldwork in the area and are hired
for that reason. Their report. either lauding or
critical of the contractors to whom they are
bound, is generally given only to the
government or to the company which contracted
the report. thus fulfilling the legal requirement
of the country but often not working in any
catalytic manner to change or better the lives of
those whom they are writing about. Thus there
is little that is accomplished besides the
exchange of money. Dan Jorgensen. an
anthropologist with considerable experience
working in Papua New Guinea notes that it is
generally extremely difficult for anyone to get a
copy of these reports (personal conespondence.
2002). If granted, they are generally through
'someone who knows some one who can get a
photocopy'. While often argued that the only
persons who read academic anthropological
literature are other anthropologists. at least in
the case of the academic. findings are published
in the public domain and therefore are both
open to critical debate and less likely to be
entrenched as suggestions of 'truth'. There are
some notable exceptions to this rule. including
the recently published set of reports sunounding
the Porgera Gold Mine, which I will discuss
later (Filer ed.: 2001). Given these constraints.
is this type of consultancy work as Brutti (200 I :
95) wonders, "scientific prostitution"?
Jorgensen says that for the consultant
who wishes to get around these non-disclosun:
agreements. and make social disruptions and
company transgressions known, there are at
least four possible avenues. The first. and. if
successful, the best manner to straddle this
divide is to negotiate into one's contract a
clause that allows the researcher to publish their
findings in academic journals as well. While
this is laudable, the contractor can be confident
in knowing that, even in academic journals, most
work will not reach the eyes of persons in a
position to work against them. This is the rarest
of the situations and the question of reading the
academic work of a researcher who one knows
has been commissioned by a mining company
leads, in my mind to decreasing her or his
authOlity and legitimacy.
The second method is to get the
contractor to include a clause in the contract that
says the author may publish in academic journals,
but only if the contractor is first allowed to look at
the work. However, the might and lawyer
purchasing ability of the corporations who
contract this work, and the ability of states to
make future academic research difficult if not
impossible means that any contract anthropologist
is still extraordinarily constrained in this situation
(see also Greider: 1993).
The third method is more specifically in
relation to_ anthropologists who have been
contracted in the beginning stages of a large
project like the Papua New Guinea mines
mentioned previously. This clause often
stipulates that the contract anthropologist may
publish her or his findings anywhere they please,
but only after a delay of up to one year.
Generally, according to Jorgensen. by the time
that any publication of the negative effects of the
project could be made known, the production
process is already well under way and agreements
and contracts with local peoples and government
have already been pushed through. Again, any
possible good that could have come from the
report would have been lost due to the exigencies
of the clauses in the contract. Those in favour of
anthropological consultants argue the imp0l1ance
of creating some record of the transgressions and
downfalls of the contracting company. and thus
the anthropologist can have some measure of
comfol1 knowing that she or he has done at least
that. Is this a worthwhile enough cause? Is this
conscience clearing exercise in the hopes that a
future law suit (as many of the subjects of these
studies are prone to file) will hopefully have
access to this report enough'?
I have been. perhaps wrongfully,
intimating that the people about whom these
social impact studies are written are totally
against the development projects which hire these
consultant anthropologists. This is untrue. By
and large. the people in this Papua New Guinean
contcxt who are involved with these projects are
the most disenfranchised in the country. It would
be paternalistic and na"ive to think that these
people are unaware of the more technologically
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advanced world around them and a silly
essentialist argument to say that these
'traditional' people would prefer to live in what
is perceived to be a static and unchanging
world. Papua New Guineans do not live in a
vacuum, globalization. as mentioned in the
introduction is a process that has always been in
action. Papua New Guineans recognize the
benefits. socially and economically that could
come about as a result of having access to the
compensation and jobs provided by these
mining initiatives. However, as Jorgensen
( 1997) notes, these issues are extremely
complex and not easily solved even by a several
month stint from a consulting anthropologist.
The fourth method that Jorgensen presents
(2002) as a way of circumventing these non-
disclosure agreements is to lobby to include a
clause in the consulting anthropologist's
contract that stipulates that the people about
whom the study is written receive access to said
study. Brutti notes that often reports are
confidential, and asks "Why should the social
actors of the survey not know the results of the
study in which they stand as main characters?"
(2001: 95). The idea behind this act of
resistance is that the people about whom this
study is written may then lobby more strongly
for a stronger bargaining position or to stop the
process of the development as a result of this
study. This too seems a viable solution on the
surface. Yet, if one is a researcher with enough
invested in an area to write against the actions
of a large scale development project such as a
mine, would it not be better to advocate and
work directly with the people involyed rather
than lend one's own name and thus claims to
legitimacy and explicit ownership of their work
to the very people one is criticizing?
Implicit in these attempts to avoid a
non-disclosure agreement is the issue of
ownership. With or without any of these
clauses in a consultant anthropologist's contract
there are still considerable obstacles for the
anthropologist with a conscience who wants her
or his findings to be made easily and broadly
public without fear of pressure from the
contracting body. Jorgensen suggests that
anthropologists who have worked first as an
academic researcher who then are hired to work
as a consultant may try to publish their
criticisms and findings based on the idea that
their work comes out of their past research and
is therefore not owned by the contracting
company. Or, if the anthropologist wants that
desperately to write academically the results of
their contract work, she or he could simply return
to the area of contract work, ask all of the same
questions again, and now have their own
ownership of the findings. Finally, if the
anthropologist does want desperately to voice his
or her concerns, she or he could simply publish
despite the terms of their agreement, on the
reasoning that any publication would be in areas
not widely read by the public and any legal action
taken on behalf of the contracting company would
open them to too much media scrutiny and would
not be pursued. Are these actions enough for a
clear conscience? I am unsure. It seems that if the
only way to work as an applied anthropologist for
one of these companies or development projects
is to have to circumvent the law, to get the money
and then to voice one's concerns, that one is too
complicit to claim any authority about the matter.
The immediate response to this line or
argument would be something on the lines of
'well, at least it is doing something right'?
Indeed, Brutti (200 I) argues that none-
involvement, "flailing against big bad windmills"
is useless and that a Trojan horse method would
be more effective for an anthropologist who really
wants to seek some kind of positive impact:
Such a kind of approach [a
consultant hired by the
development firm writing a
report] may be more helpful
than an international court case,
because once anthropologists
are inside the mechanism they
are perceived as interlocutors
rather than adversaries and as
interlocutors, they have much
more negotiating power within
the company (Brutti: 200 1,96).
I find it difficult to fall in line with this type of
argument. The hired anthropologist may be an
interlocutor in one sense, but they are also
contractually bound. Because anthropologists
generally feel some affiliation towards the people
with whom they have completed their research, is
this not some form of, at least perceptual
transgression, to then work for the constituency
(the mining company) who is trying to negotiate
the most favourable deal for themselves and
possibly against these persons as possible. This
line of argument opens further questions.
Consider the situation of the anthropologist who
might be against a development project for
reasons of social upheaval, environmental
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damage, or long term effects to the population
and area. Consider also that the 'local' people,
that is those she or he is commissioned to
study, may want this development. This begs
the question of whether non-involvement on
these grounds is akin to some form of
paternalism and whether it is in fact a betrayal
of the persons whom have given you the great
gift of access to their culture. I will return to
that idea of obligation later, but for now it
seems prudent to explore the question of
paternalism.
Mining initiatives are big business: the
Porgera mine in Papua New Guinea represented
an initial investment of nearly three qum1ers of
a billion dollars (Filer, ed.: 2001). This
represents an enormous boom in infrastructure
and income for the entire country. A company
with that much capital for investment will not
easily be dissuaded. Arguably, regm'dless of the
intervention of any number of anthropologists
outlining the potential long and short term
hazards, such a venture would go forth, In that
case, would choosing the path of non-
intervention, but knowing that the mine would
go forth regardless be construed as a
paternalistic act? What political statement
would be made? Is non-involvement to be
perceived as some throw-back to the origins of
the discipline? Would the message be that the
anthropologist would rather artificially wish for
these particular Papua New Guineans to be
frozen in time, bounded and isolated from the
nefarious baddies of the outside world? Audre
Lorde says "Your silence will not protect you".
Nor will it protect, by extension, those with
which you have had some contact and research
relationships. To my mind, non-intervention in
this situation is not silence, it is a political act.
It is choosing non-complicity with a system of
capital movement and investment that has been
shown time and time again, regardless of the
number of 'rapid ethnographic and social
impact assessments' to be disastrous. Framed
in this manner, with regard to the larger social
and structural, political and economic
machinations, non-involvement may in fact be
the strongest position from the anthropologist
can take. There is, in Bourdieu's terminology a
"myth of non-political academic discourse and
objectivity" (1990). In truth, everything that an
anthropologist or academic wlites or does not
write is both subjective and highly political.
Debates of this kind always spawn
questions of "Yeah, but what if.. .", What if you
felt that there was a possibility that the social
impact or assessment report would be beneficial?
What if all of your recommendations as a
consulting anthropologist were taken to heart and
put into action and not used as a way of fulfilling
the minimum in terms of the law of the land and
identifying for the contracting body possible
loopholes in future lawsuits? The truth of the
matter is that these situations do not exist, or at
least not as frequently as could be construed
significant, and as long as the interests of the
company lie in accruing maximum financial gain,
the work of the anthropologist will always be
compromised.
Having dealt with the question of
paternalism, I must return then to the issues at
stake with regards to obligation. In the case
studies I have been examining, all of the
anthropologists who worked either for the state, a
mining outfit, or a NGO had previously done
fieldwork in the area. If, as I maintain,
anthropology starts with an enormous gift, this
also means, on some level, it incurs an enormous
debt. Martha Macintyre was hired by a mining
company in Papua New Guinea to do a social
impact assessment about a group of people with
whom she had previously done fieldwork. She
writes: "I felt that by putting my knowledge to
some useful end, I could in some way 'pay a debt'
to the people of Milne Bay who had provided me
with hospitality and shared their knowledge and
understandings with me as I did fieldwork over
the previous eight years" (Macintyre: 2001, 109).
Anthropologists must, on some level feel a sense
of 'reactive obligation' to the people with whom
they have shared their fieldwork experience. This
feeling of obligation and emotional investment
might be grounds for many to decide that if a
consultancy position is offered they should accept
it out of some form of duty to that community.
Recall that my concern is with the anthropologist
who works on behalf of the mining company,
state or other larger more dominant group.
Should, for example, the residents of Milne Bay
have approached Martha Macintyre, I think that
the reasoning and ethics would be entirely
different. Paid or unpaid, to act as an advocate or
researcher at the behest of the group who is to be
studied brings with it far different power
dynamics. Though the problems of the type of
literature produced would be similar (grey as
opposed to academic), I believe that the shift in
positionality of working for the persons who are
to be affected by these large 'development'
projects mitigates those concerns. Presumably, in
a situation wherein the anthropologist is working
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for a 'local' group the constraints of non-
disclosure would certainly not apply.
Yet for all of this ethical pondeling and
table banging, I have still only addressed the
concerns of the anthropologist as an individual,
and the constraints on a personal professional
academic career. I have not mentioned the
possible effects the work of the consultant
anthropologist on the discipline as a whole.
These are, to my mind, many. Recall also that
with regards to this paper, I am addressing
anthropologists who straddle the divide between
academic and consultant researcher. Whether
or not these ground rules change if the
anthropologist claims to be working outside of
the academic spectrum is beyond the scope of
this paper. Though it may be significant to
note, that for academics. it is their obligation,
ethically, to publish that which they find. It
seems important to reiterate that contractual
restraints if not deny this responsibility, then
they at least limit the possibility of fulfilling this
duty. Perhaps the title, the ascription of
anthropologist, of doctor of anything to do with
the social sciences carries with it some sort of
authority and legitimacy that, if misused, could
compromise the discipline. I have been
questioned on this stance. Many would argue
that I put too much emphasis on the power of
the academic. But recall again the specific
circumstances about which I am speaking. The
consultant anthropologists in these situations are
working in an area in which post-secondary
(indeed in some cases, even secondary)
education is not easily attainable. Just as high
cost commodities such as vehicle and foreign
food are valued higher than local goods, so too
is advanced education given a higher value,
authority and legitimacy than local indigenous
knowledge. The foreigner (i.e. the consultant
anthropologist), is representative of both the
highly desirable foreign goods as well as a
foreign (and therefore somehow better)
education. The power dialectic that is forged as
a result must be taken into account.
That being said I think it is imperative
to include in this argument some discussion on
the ways in which the consultant or applied
anthropologist's work may affect the rest of the
discipline. Strathern and Stewart argue:
The political position of the
[consultant] research worker
can be characterized by the
following elements: [I] The
research worker is interstitial
between power groups. [2] the
people may therefore
overestimate the research
worker's ability to mediate
between these groups. [3] The
research worker is perceived as
someone whose loyalty to
another interest group must be
won over. [4] The research
worker must then demonstrate
this loyalty; but from the
researcher's own viewpoint it is
most important to be able to
preserve a degree of neutrality
in order to remain impm1ial
(2001: 12).
There are many issues at work here. First,
though secondary to the point to which I am
trying to put forth is the difficulty that the
consultant researcher has in attempting to present
some form of objectivity while working
ostensibly from a discipline which has in the past
several decades made a point to argue that their
work is neither objective nor impal1ial but
recognition of this subjectivity can only add to
the quality of the work. Second, and more
important to the current issue, is the way in
which the consulting anthropologist's position is
changed in relation to that of the studied
population. The researcher is no longer someone
who is there because she or he has an interest in
the way that the 'local' population works. They
are now using the research gained previously to
gain recompense from a company that mayor
may not have the groups best interest in mind and
who is someone whose work can at least
perceptually, be manipulated by the company for
a better negotiating position. It is my opinion
that if something is perceived to be true, then it is
true in its practice. To be sure, this position is
not new by any stretch of the imagination. Many
ethnographic accounts give detail of how the
reseal'cher is welcomed and then used as a tool to
gain either bureaucratic or monetary assistance.
The situation when the anthropologist is in
actuality or perceived to be representative of
another interest (e.g. in these cases, the mining
company) however, changes the situation. Brutti
(200 I) writes of his experience and others that
there is a tendency to "assimilate the researcher
to the company directing the survey". This puts
the researcher in a precarious position. Scaglion
writes explicitly about this in his work (200 I).
Scaglion was employed by the government of
New Guinea to oversee some changes in
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traditional law and ownership claims. Work of
this nature could be very useful for mining and
other resource development countries that need
to negotiate compensation payments with local
groups. He writes in detail about his first
fieldwork experience as one in which he
am ved dusty and without resources to be taken
in as a son amongst his informants. Returning
some years later as an academic anthropologist
working for the government he writes, "I felt
acutely that I was part of that bureaucracy. My
government duties had conflicted with my
responsibilities as a member of the local
conmmnity" (Scaglion: 200 I, 52). No longer
the "incompetent son" he was now in many
ways a person who must be defened and
appealed to in a manner that he said "often
made me feel like a hypocrite" (ibid. 49). He
further notes that his position as an employee
of the Public Services commission forced him
to formulate questions and resolutions in a way
that as an anthropologist he knew were
incompatible for the group with which he had
done his fieldwork. Thus, in trying to fulfill his
reactive obligation and provide assistance,
Scaglion had conunitted a kind of cultural
treason. Two things mise out of Scaglion' s
account. The first is the difficulty that Scaglion
had reconciling himself to his new position.
Secondly, and more to do with the effect on the
discipline as a whole, with the increase of
anthropological consultants in Papua New
Guinea, and their accompanying reception as
persons of authority and synonymy with
development and mining companies, how will
future generations of anthropologists be able to
conduct their academic research? I am not. to
be sure, suggesting any form of simplicity on
the part of the local populations. I am simply
noting that the perception of the role of the
anthropologist as someone who does research
for the sake of research will be compromised.
This is a tenuous point to be sure, but one that I
feel must be mentioned. Beyond even these
finer points, Greider argues that there is anothcr
way that the applied anthropologist does not
fulfill their own reactive obligation to her or his
own discipline: "Applied anthropologists oftcn
have a wealth of research findings that never
become part of the academic literature, if the
findings are repOlted. they may be masked to
such an extent that their contribution to social
science is limited" (Greider: 1993,432).
Barring even the ways around non-disclosure
agreements proposed by Jorgensen earlier. this
argument would seem to propose a stronger
possible position of criticism and advocacy by
virtue of having greater backing of other
academics.
I have not yet brought up the issue of
anthropologists who work as consultants or even
employees for NGOs in relation to the effect of
the work on the discipline as whole. It is perhaps
in this arena that the issue of damage to the
discipline as a result of a prevalence of applied
anthropologists must be considered. To be clear,
I do not believe that the same dangers are inherent
in this situation as in those wherein the
anthropologist works for the development
initiative (mining company) directly. However, I
would feel remiss if I were to ignore some of the
potential hazards endemic in working for NGOs.
Paige West worked independently as an academic
researcher within a wildlife management project
in Papua New Guinea and argues:
the people of ... the project area
are characterized by NGOs as
both ignorant of and threatening
to their environment. By using
anthropologically based
terminology to discuss
indigenous or local peoples,
NGOs give the allusion of
attention being paid to local
social practices and social
relations (West: 200 I, 68-9).
She says that rampant misrepresentation can be
the result of this co-optation. Obviously
anthropologists do not have the copyright on their
language. But the addition of anthropologists in
to the arena of NGOs, who can fall prey to the
same development traps as either the state or
corporation, has dangerous feel of complicity
similar to that of working for a company.
Wagner (2001: 88-9) sees trouble when NGOs
use the presence of anthropologists as a claim to
legitimacy for their own projects. He tells of
being given office space within an NGO in Papua
New Guinea for his own research purposes, only
to find out that his presence was being publicized
as an political strategy for the NGO to use his
academic credibility to gain access to more
funds. I find the 'ends justi fy the means'
counter-argument to this allegation of complicity
unhelpful especially when the anthropologist's
name (and if frequent enough the discipline's
name) is subjected to a loss of credibility in the
process. West wonies that the co-optation of
anthropological terminology for the production
'Ii lTI'\1 ,,,I II ~1I11~ ~1I11;
Copl"right C 2'111.; 'Ii n 1 \1 1"1" 1'\\ I) I"uflul of .\nthropologl"
Geer: The Tricky/Trickster Role of the Anthropologist
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2003
and reproduction of local peoples may be
misconstrued as the new twenty first century
anthropology. These misrepresentations may
lead to essentialisms that do only disservice to
the indigenous knowledge and claims that
circulate and thus reflect both on the discipline
and the 'good intentions' applied
anthropologist who lends their name and
credibility to an NGO.
These sins of good intent. are it seems
lesser than the sins of those who feel it
necessary to lend their name and legitimacy to
companies on the reasoning that some
intervention is better than none. Macintyre
highlights an extremely salient point in the
following.
The expectation that the most
disruptive conflict will be
between the mining company
and the conununity informs
most terms of
reference .... conflict with the
company can be dramatic and
disruptive, but conflict within
the conununity is cOHosive
and the source of many of the
social problems that emerge
and become entrenched
(2001:113).
Thus it seems that a false binary is set up when
an anthropologist works as an interlocutor from
within a company. Scaglion's experience as
well as Strathern and Stewart's assertion that
the contract can bind the scope of the analysis
is impOttant to remember. The academic
researcher, or even the contract researcher who
is working on behalf of the local indigenous
group, is able to formulate their analysis in
ways that may exceed the scope of the direct
relationship between company and the local.
Many of the authors examined who were in
favor of the work of the applied anthropologist
spoke in terms of being able to identify long
and shOtt term hazards. Yet, they are
identified, mostly for the contractor. If the
anthropologist is not constrained, and has the
ability to report her or his findings to the
population under study, does not this
population have a greater base from which to
provide resistance to the encroachment of
development projects; or if halting the project
is not the concern, at least negotiate from a
stronger position?
Every decision that we make, both as
academics and as people who are present in the
world is political. The degree to which we feel
we can work towards mitigation of perceived or
potential wrong doings is affected by the arena in
which we choose to act. History has shown that
the ethical responsibilities of even the academic
anthropologist are heavy. The burden
representing, if even only one's own experience
of another culture is heavy, and misinterpretations
can lead to dire consequences. Yet, the
reflexivity and subjectivity of the discipline make
its own demands in terms of where authority can
most cogently be drawn.
I am not alone in my ethical table
pounding. Kirsch, an anthropologist who began
work as a consultant for the Ok Tedi mining
project in Papua New Guinea and then moved to
work as an advocate in conjunction with a NGO
because he felt his work was being
misrepresented argues, "activism is a logical
extension of the conurutment to reciprocity that
underlies the practice of anthropology". Perhaps
it is the anthropologist who publishes where and
when she or he wants, and works outside of the
discipline, untethered by the constraints of the
consultant's contract who can most stand up for
both their own personal beliefs as well as uphold
the standards of the academy. Hyndman writes:
"The role of the anthropologist and activist have
been effectively combined to analyze the social
costs of the environmental problems and suggest
remedies for the mining crisis" (Hyndman 2001:
46).
The role of the anthropologist in
development is tricky at best. The anthropologist
who chooses to work for a major resource
extraction company is compromised on several
different levels. These include: ownership,
censorship, co-optation of work and legitimacy,
as well as transgressions both to the informants as
well as the discipline from which the trained
anthropologist garners their authority and
academic freedom. Escobar (1991: 677) writes:
"Development anthropology, for all its claim to
relevance to local problems, to cultural
sensitivity, and to access to interpretive holistic
methods, has done no more than recycle, and
dress in more localized fabrics, the discourses of
modernization and development". Whether the
severity of this situation bears truth, the sentiment
needs to be recognized. The anthropologist has
only her or his name and thus the choices that she
or he makes in terms of for whom they will work
have long term ramifications. It is my contention
that writing from within the academy is the
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strongest possible posItIOn from which any
attempts to fulfill a reciprocal obligation to the
people who first gave the anthropologist the
enormous gift of access into their culture.
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